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Abstract
We conducted an anonymous survey in December 2013 asking around 200
economists worldwide to provide an interval (a to b) of average inflation in the
US expected “over the next two years”. The respondents were also instructed
to give a probability of inflation being higher or lower than the mid-interval
(a+b)/2. The aggregate distribution of inflation expectations we obtain closely
resembles the outcome of the Survey of Professional Forecasters for 1Q2014.
More importantly, we find that the subjective probability mass on either side
of the mid-interval is not statistically different from 0.5, which means that the
subjective distributions are symmetric. Our results align well with several
papers evaluating the Survey of Professional Forecasters or similar data sets
and finding no significant departures from symmetry.
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1 Introduction
Inflation expectations constitute a vital part of decision making by companies and
policymakers alike. In surveys regarding future inflation, respondents are asked
to provide their inflation expectations by specifying a point forecast, an interval1
or an entire distribution of possible outcomes2. The question of how to aggregate
point forecast or interval data and compute summary statistics touches upon a
rich literature examining subjective probability distributions. Specifically, if the
survey participants had symmetrically distributed inflation expectations within
the bounds they provide, the mean of the interval mid-points would be an ac-
curate statistic for average expected inflation, while the average interval width
would be one possible measure for the degree of uncertainty associated with this
expected mean. When one departs from the assumption of a symmetric distribu-
tion, however, it gets more complicated. As García and Manzanares (2007) show
in the context of the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF), subjective expec-
tation distributions can exhibit skewness, implying that routinely reported sum-
mary statistics do not give a good picture of perceived inflation risks. In particular,
they document that during the Volcker era, when inflation was low or negative,
the SPF respondents’ expectations factored in inflation risks, even while mean ex-
pected inflation was low or declining. Asymmetries in inflation expectations are
important, they argue, as they might explain the inflation scares observed in the
bond market (particularly in 1983-1984).
In this paper we conduct a simple survey to directly test for asymmetries in infla-
tion expectations provided in interval form. We make use of the transition of Fed
leadership from Ben Bernanke to Janet Yellen in the beginning of 2014 to hide
the technical aspect of the survey behind a political framing. In a first step, we
ask respondents, a sample of non-professional forecasters with an economic back-
ground (so that we can be sure they know what inflation is), to provide intervals
for their inflation expectations under Ben Bernanke’s or Janet Yellen’s leadership.
In a second step, we randomize participants into groups which are then asked
about the probability they assign to inflation being higher or lower than the mid-
points of the intervals they provided. We find that the probabilities provided by
1For example, the Regional Network Company Survey conducted by the Swiss National Bank
(SNB). Survey results are regularly published in the monetary policy report: link (in German).
2Most notably, the Survey of Professional Forecasters conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank
of Philadelphia: link.
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our respondents do not depart significantly from 50%, using several different sta-
tistical techniques. Additionally, we find no evidence for excess perceived inflation
risks, as neither the probability that inflation is higher or lower than the mid-
point exceed 50%. We also analyze whether inflation expectations are different
under Ben Bernanke’s or Janet Yellen’s leadership. Surprisingly (to us, at least),
the average mid-range inflation expectations when only including those that give
different intervals for the two scenarios indicate that expected inflation would be
higher if Bernanke were to remain the Fed chair. Finally, we conduct robustness
checks to mitigate concerns that our results are driven by the non-professionality
(in terms of forecasting) of our sample. We do not find that more sophisticated
or experienced forecasters’ expectations distributions exhibit a different degree of
asymmetry.
Our paper relates to the literature on the analysis of expectation surveys, such
as the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF). There is no consensus yet on
the correct distribution to model subjective expectations. García and Manzanares
(2007) find skewness at certain points in time, which is also what Lahiri, Teigland
and Zaporowski (1988) find, using a different data set. Murasawa (2013) reports
similar findings for household inflation expectations. Contrary to these findings,
Clements (2014) finds little evidence for asymmetry in SPF inflation expectation
distributions. In line with the latter paper and using survey data, De Bruin, Man-
ski, Topa and van der Klaauw (2011) find that the mean of individual distributions
is an accurate statistic for expected inflation at the aggregate level, but, on the
other hand, in many cases poorly describes individual expectations. A different
but related strand of the literature compares forecasters’ point predictions with
the central tendencies of their subjective probability distributions, generally find-
ing that the two measures do not always agree (Engelberg, Manski and Williams
(2009), Clements (2010)).
Our paper provides guidance for the design and analysis of expectation surveys
in general and inflation expectation surveys in particular. We contribute to the
literature on subjective expectations with our finding that the inflation expecta-
tion distributions of our sample of non-professional forecasters with an economic
background do not exhibit asymmetry, using a unique experimental set-up. Our
paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the survey, section 3 illustrates
the extracted inflation expectations, section 4 analyzes the provided subjective
distributions and describes several robustness checks we performed.
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2 The Survey
In this section we detail our survey methodology. We designed the survey to be
short in order to get a maximum response rate. Respondents answered 4 questions
regarding headline inflation expectations in the U.S. over the next two years. The
target audience were non-professional forecasters with an economic background,
so that we could be sure that they were familiar with the basic concepts and knew
who Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen are. We sent invitations to complete the
online survey by email between December 2013 and February 2014, providing
a link to a homepage hosted by the University of Zurich. The survey was an-
swered by about 200 economists from the Federal Reserve System, European Sys-
tem of Central Banks, Norges Bank, Riksbank, Stanford University, University of
Chicago, Columbia University, University of California at Berkeley, Bocconi Uni-
versity, University of St. Gallen, University of Zurich and Swiss National Bank,
among others. The online survey presented participants with four questions on
three pages and saved their answers in a database. The estimated response time
was roughly 1.5 minutes.
An overview of the four questions is given in Table 1. The first question, “Do you
have a background in economics and/or statistics?” (yes/no), was designed to test
whether we reached the target audience and used to select only those that actually
did have such a background. In question 2, respondents were asked to provide an
interval for their expectation regarding headline inflation in the next two years
after Janet Yellen begins her appointment as chair of the Federal Reserve. In
question 3, respondents were asked to provide an interval under the counterfac-
tual assumption that Ben Bernanke would remain at that post. For question 4 we
randomly assigned participants into one of four groups as detailed in Table 1. We
asked participants to report the probability (in %) that average headline inflation
would be below (groups 1 and 3) or above (groups 2 and 4) the mid-point of the
interval that they provided in questions 2 and 4, if Ben Bernanke had remained
chairman (groups 1 and 2) or under Janet Yellen (groups 3 and 4).
The political framing of the questions was intended to prevent participants from
answering the survey as if it was a purely technical inquiry. We anticipated that
most of the respondents in our sample would be well aware of different methods
to estimate inflation, and we intended to put the focus on a real world scenario in-
stead of pure technicalities. Questions 2 and 3 were posed on the same survey page
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so that respondents directly saw that they needed to provide two intervals, one for
Janet Yellen as chair, and one for Ben Bernanke as chair. The intention, beside dis-
tracting respondents from technicalities, was to see whether political beliefs cause
shifts in the probability distributions. The randomization regarding whether av-
erage inflation would be below or above the mid-point of the respondent-provided
interval intended to capture asymmetries in the distribution.
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Table 1: Survey Design
Question Group Wording Answers
1 all
Do you have a background in economics
and/or statistics?
yes/no
2 all
Where do you expect to see average headline
inflation* in the U.S. over the next two years
after Janet Yellen begins her appointment as
the new chairman of the Federal Reserve
(Fed)?
interval
3 all
Where do you expect to see average headline
inflation* in the U.S. over the next two years
if Ben Bernanke had remained chairman of
the Fed?
interval
4 1
Were Ben Bernanke to remain Chairman of
the Fed, what would be the probability of
average headline inflation over the next two
years being below x%†
%
4 2
Were Ben Bernanke to remain Chairman of
the Fed, what would be the probability of
average headline inflation over the next two
years being above x%†
%
4 3
After Janet Yellen takes the helm of the Fed,
what is the probability of average headline
inflation over the next two years being below
x%†
%
4 4
After Janet Yellen takes the helm of the Fed,
what is the probability of average headline
inflation over the next two years being above
x%†
%
† x refers to the mid-point of the interval provided by respondents in questions 2 and 3, respec-
tively. The sign * denoted a footnote in questions 2 and 3 that stated: “* Annual percentage
change in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) released by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics”.
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In total, 184 respondents completed the survey between December 6th 2013 and
February 28th 2014.3 Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for this sample. Regard-
ing the inflation prediction intervals, we see that they look similar both in terms
of spread and mid-point irrespective of whether Janet Yellen or Ben Bernanke is
in control. A few respondents factor in some probability for deflation (negative
inflation) in their lower bounds, while some indicate at least a possibility for very
high inflation (8%). The mid-points are close to two percent. The mean indicated
probability that average inflation is higher or lower than the mid-point is close to
50 percent.
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
Question Mean st.dev. Min Max
Q1. Economist (0=no, 1=yes) 1.000 0.000 1.0 1.0
Q2. Yellen lower bound 1.204 0.812 -2.0 4.0
Q2. Yellen upper bound 2.826 1.030 1.0 8.0
Q2. Yellen mid-point 2.015 0.734 0.5 5.0
Q3. Bernanke lower bound 1.157 0.753 -2.0 3.0
Q3. Bernanke upper bound 2.677 0.914 0.9 8.0
Q3. Bernanke mid-point 1.917 0.634 0.5 5.0
Q4. Prob. smaller/larger than mid-point 49.497 16.966 2.5 90.0
Observations 184
Finally, in Table 3, we check whether our randomization strategy worked by com-
paring answers to questions 2 and 3 among our four groups. Note that random-
ization only affected question 4, so there should not be a statistically significant
difference in answers to previous questions. Group sizes are similar and close to
50. Lower and upper bounds of the inflation intervals, as well as the mid-points,
are similar for the four groups. In column 4 of Table 3, we report P-Values for the
Wald test when regressing these outcomes on group indicator variables. The P-
Values are well above any usually accepted significance level, which suggests that
assignment to a group was not related to previous answers. We conclude from
these results that our randomization strategy worked.
3This excludes 2 respondents who indicated that they did not have an economic background and
3 who gave a probability of 0 for inflation below/above their provided mid-points.
7
Table 3: Randomization
Mean answer
Question Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 P > F†
Q2. Yellen lower bound 1.272 1.183 1.051 1.318 0.426
Q2. Yellen upper bound 2.972 2.937 2.636 2.745 0.354
Q2. Yellen mid-point 2.122 2.060 1.843 2.032 0.311
Q3. Bernanke lower bound 1.181 1.154 1.038 1.259 0.580
Q3. Bernanke upper bound 2.798 2.798 2.536 2.559 0.327
Q3. Bernanke mid-point 1.990 1.976 1.787 1.909 0.407
Observations 43 52 45 44 184
† Column “P > F” reports the P-Value for the Wald test when regressing question answers on
group indicator variables. If belonging to a group had explanatory power regarding questions 2
and 3, this value should be low (e.g. below 0.05).
Figure 1: Surveyed Intervals for Expected Inflation.
The figure reports surveyed intervals for expected inflation across the respondents and conditional
on Janet Yellen (dashed red line) or Ben Bernanke (green solid line) being Fed’s chair. The intervals
are reordered from the one with the lowest mid-range to the one with the highest mid-range.
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3 Intervals of Expected Inflation
As previously illustrated, every survey respondent could specify an interval for ex-
pected inflation conditional on Ben Bernanke or Janet Yellen being the Fed chair.
Figure 1 reports the provided intervals in an ascending order from the respondent
who provided the lowest mid-range.
The majority of respondents gave the same interval for the two scenarios. 57 out
of 184 (31%) of them provided a different interval and we compared the samples
of lower and upper bounds for the two chairs using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
to see whether these differences are statistically important. We could not reject
the null hypothesis, that the two distributions are the same statistically, with the
test statistic of 0.054 (p-value 0.94) for the lower bound and 0.0761 (0.64) for the
upper bound. We plot kernel densities of the four samples in figure 2.
Figure 2: Kernel Densities of Surveyed Intervals.
The figure reports estimated densities of lower and upper bound for expected inflation conditional
on Janet Yellen (dashed red line) or Ben Bernanke (green solid line) being Fed’s chair. The estimate
is based on a normal kernel function, using a window parameter (width) that is a function of the
given number of points.
Interestingly, if we consider the responses with different intervals for the two sce-
narios, Janet Yellen was perceived as less, not more dovish than the chairman
Bernanke would be.4 42 out of 57 mid-ranges of inflation under Yellen are lower
4Differently from what news agencies in the US were reporting at the time, see for example the
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than the corresponding ones under Bernanke, with the average mid-range of 1.957
and 2.273, respectively. The averages are statistically different with t-stat of 3.16.
Finally, we compare inflation expectations from our survey to the outcome of the
Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF) released in February 2014.5 The most
comparable forecasts to our survey consider annual core CPI inflation for 2015
and we plot the mean probabilities from the SPF against mid-ranges under the
scenario that Yellen becomes the Fed chair in Figure 3. As it can be noticed, the
two distributions are almost equivalent.
This is interesting for two reasons. First, a simple interval survey question leads
to the same aggregate expectation distribution at much less of a cost to the individ-
ual respondent. Second, our results on symmetry outlined below touch a subject
of great interest in the literature, which has mainly focused on the SPF data. As
our survey leads to comparable predictions, we think our results connect well to
the existing literature.
Figure 3: Comparison to the Survey of Professional Forecasters.
The figure compares mid-ranges for expected inflation conditional on Janet Yellen (dashed red
line) being Fed’s chair versus annual core CPI inflation forecast for 2015 (solid blue line) from the
Survey of Professional Forecasters released in February 2014.
outcome of the “CNBC October Fed Survey” reported by Yahoo! Finance and available here.
5A complete writeup of the survey is available here.
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4 Subjective Distributions
This section illustrates our main result. As already mentioned, we asked the sur-
vey respondents in question 4 to provide a probability of expected inflation being
higher or lower than a given mid-range. Here, we show that the probability is not
statistically different from 0.5, and thus that subjective distribution functions are
on average symmetric.
4.1 Student’s t-test
To test whether the sample mean has a value of 0.5, we run Student’s t-test on the
overall sample, as well as all possible sub-samples resulting from question 4. We
report the results in Table 4.
Table 4: Student’s t-stat
Below Above
No % (x%= 50) t-stat No % (x%= 50) t-stat
Bernanke 43 39.5 -0.37 52 36.5 -0.49
Yellen 45 42.2 -0.74 44 40.9 -0.54
Total 88 40.9 -0.78 96 38.5 -0.72
Total
No % (x%= 50) t-stat
95 37.9 -0.61
89 41.6 -0.91
184 39.7 -1.07
† Column “t-stat” reports the t-statistic for the Student’s t-test that the mean of the sub-sample
is different from 0.5.
The probability mass on either side of the implicit mean is not statistically differ-
ent from 0.5 independently of how we split up the sample. We also test whether
the average probability from the sub-sample “Below” is statistically different from
the “Above” sub-sample using Welch’s t-test of equal means. The test statistic is
equal to 0.64 (p-value: 0.53) and thus we are not able to reject the null hypothesis
that two means are statistically the same.
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4.2 Aggregating Subjective Distributions
Roughly 40% of respondents revealed an asymmetric distribution function. In
order to assess whether these asymmetries influence the aggregation of inflation
expectations, we compare aggregate distributions of mid-ranges
(1
2 a+ 12 b
)
with
distributions of implicit means, calculated by using the surveyed probability from
question 4 and building a two-point probability mass function for each respondent:
x%
100 a+
(
1− x%100
)
b. Figure 4 illustrates the idea.
Figure 4: Does Asymmetry Matter for Aggregation?
Incorporating skewness of subjective distributions seem to be irrelevant for the
aggregate distribution. In other words, subjective distribution functions appear
to be symmetric on average. Note that the distribution of mid-ranges conditional
on Janet Yellen being Fed’s chair is different than the one we reported in figure
3. The reason is that figure 4 regards only those respondents who had to answer
question 4 conditional on Janet Yellen being Fed’s president (i.e. the groups 3 and
4, see table 1).
4.3 Robustness Checks
Our sample consists primarily of non-professional forecasters. If only sophisti-
cated forecasters tend to quantify upside/downside risks by revealing asymmetric
distributions, our conclusion that asymmetry does not matter could suffer from a
12
selection bias. We address this concern by trying to isolate sophisticated responses
in three different ways.
4.3.1 Interval Length
We first check whether respondents, who provided narrower intervals and who
are arguably less uncertain about their forecast, tend to reveal asymmetric distri-
bution functions. Table 5 shows that almost half of the respondents provided an
interval narrower than 1 percentage point (pp), but the surveyed probability is not
statistically different from 0.5.6
Table 5: The Length of Interval and Skewness
Range (pp) No No (x%= 50) % (x%= 50) mean st.dev. t-stat
less than 1.0 88 36 40.9 47.6 16.0 -1.41
1.0 - 2.0 64 23 35.9 51.6 16.9 0.74
2.0 - 3.0 22 10 45.5 53.0 20.5 0.68
more than 3.0 10 4 40.0 45.4 16.9 -0.86
† Column “t-stat” reports the t-statistic for the Student’s t-test that the mean of the sub-
sample is different from 0.5. The sub-samples are formed according to the surveyed inter-
vals conditional on Bernanke being the Fed’s chair and using “Yellen” scenario does not
alter the results.
4.3.2 Fed Chair
We next look closely at responses that provided different intervals for expected
inflation conditional on who would be the Fed’s chair. Table 6 shows that the split
6If we split the sub-sample “1.0 - 2.0” into those who got question 4 with either “Bernanke”
(groups 1 & 2) or “Yellen” (groups 3 & 4) in it, the average probability is statistically lower than
0.5 for the letter scenario. Nonetheless, the sub-sample is relatively small with only 26 responses.
Results available upon request.
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does not seem to matter.
Table 6: Bernanke vs. Yellen
Surveyed Intervals No No (x%= 50) % (x%= 50) mean st.dev. t-stat
same 127 57 44.9 48.6 16.3 -0.93
different 57 16 28.1 51.4 18.3 0.57
† Column “t-stat” reports the t-statistic for the Student’s t-test that the mean of the sub-sample
is different from 0.5.
4.3.3 CPI or PCE (?!)
As table 1 illustrates, we asked survey participants to provide expectations for av-
erage future CPI inflation. U.S. Fed on the contrary targets inflation as measured
by the annual change in the price index for personal consumption expenditures
(PCE).7 Historically, PCE and not CPI inflation averaged around 2.0%, consistent
with the Fed’s mandate. Interestingly, surveyed mid-ranges for expected inflation
are also close to the Fed’s target instead of long-rung CPI inflation as shown in
Figure 5.
Figure 5: Surveyed Distributions vs. History
We use this “inattention” to look for responses that provided a mid-interval around
the CPI long-term median (2.3% in the sample from 1994-2013). 32 respondents
7See the FOMC statement of longer-run goals and policy strategy available here.
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provided a mid-interval between 2.1 and 2.5 %, 13 out of 32 (41%) gave 0.5 as the
probability and the subjective distributions are on average statistically equal to
0.5 (with t-stat of 0.85).
5 Conclusion
In this paper we presented evidence from a simple survey that tests for asymme-
tries in inflation expectation distributions. The survey was conducted among a
sample of non-professional forecasters with an economic background. We asked
respondents to provide their inflation expectations under two different Fed chairs,
Ben Bernanke if he would not have stepped down, and Janet Yellen. Our results
do not reveal any patterns of asymmetry in their expectations, implying that the
interval mid-points give an accurate representation of average expected inflation,
and interval length would be one possible summary statistic for the degree of un-
certainty.
These results are in line with several previous studies who analyzed the Survey of
Professional Forecasters or similar data sets and found no significant departures
from symmetry. However, we caution that our results reflect expectations at a
particular point in time, and that it may well be that our findings depend on the
general business cycle situation. We address concerns about different degrees in
forecasters’ sophistication and find no evidence that this aspect matters for sym-
metry. From a political stand-point, it seems interesting to note that our sample—
economists from reputable academic and policy institutions—expect lower infla-
tion under Janet Yellen’s leadership compared to the hypothetical scenario of Ben
Bernanke remaining chair of the Fed.
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